Journal for the Philosophy of Language, Mind and the Art, 2024
In order to argue that Being is incomplete, this article engages recent views which regard metaph... more In order to argue that Being is incomplete, this article engages recent views which regard metaphysical grounding as a form of ontological dependence. In contrast to foundational versions of grounding, it argues that grounding is ubiquitous, multidirectional, and multilevel. Each thing partially grounds, generates, and constitutes every other thing. Grounding is never full. Since grounding is always partial, a thing is never fully real. This is a condition of possibility of its reality. If it were to be fully grounded, per impossible, it would be incapable of further development or change. It would be wholly static and frozen. This is true for each thing and for the universe itself. The monistic One is never fully one and reality is never completely real. This ontology is hunky: everything partly grounds and is grounded by everything else, so that everything has parts and also is a constituent in a greater whole. Whereas the Indian philosopher Nāgārjuna would assert that this means everything is empty and unreal, everything is partially real. However, things are never fully real because they are never fully grounded.
It is impossible to deduce the properties of a strongly emergent whole from a complete knowledge ... more It is impossible to deduce the properties of a strongly emergent whole from a complete knowledge of the properties of its constituents, according to C. D. Broad, when those constituents are isolated from the whole or when they are constituents of other wholes. Elanor Taylor proposes the Collapse Problem. Macro-level property p supposedly emerges when its micro-level components combine in relation r. However, each component has the property that it can combine with the others in r to produce p. Broad's nondeducibility criterion is not met. This article argues that the amount of information required for r is physically impossible. Strong Emergence does not collapse. But the Collapse Problem does. Belief in Strong Emergence is strongly warranted. Strong Emergence occurs whenever it is physically impossible to deduce how components, in a specific relation, would combine to produce a whole with p. Almost always, that is impossible. Strong Emergence is ubiquitous.
Karen Bennett maintains that some metaphysical debates have stalemated. M. B. Willard claims that... more Karen Bennett maintains that some metaphysical debates have stalemated. M. B. Willard claims that all metaphysical debates result in draws. They regard stalemates and draws as impasses. Their precursor, Kant, maintains that reason falls into contradictions, antinomies, where equally compelling arguments can be given for the theses and antitheses. Advocating dialetheism, Hegel recognizes that reality itself is contradictory. Impasses indicate that contradictory positions are each partially correct, and that those positions must be sublated. While Hegel and Graham Priest agree that there are true contradictions, contra Robert B. Brandom, Michela Bordignon shows that their dialetheisms are significantly different. Hegel's dynamic dialectical logic does not entail trivialism. To not be one with reality, which is not one with itself, is paradoxically to be one with it.
Rejecting the received account, which includes procedural and semantic memory, Stanley B. Klein c... more Rejecting the received account, which includes procedural and semantic memory, Stanley B. Klein claims that only episodic memory is genuine memory. This is so, he asserts, because only episodic memory is partly constituted by a quale, a Nagelian 'what it is like' feeling of the past. However, his actual position reveals a very different set of claims about memory, one that involves a distinctive feel, distinct from Nagelian qualia and other versions of what qualia are. We argue that Klein's actual position significantly differs from what he claims memory is. And we try to describe what Kleinian qualia should feel like. We suspect that they might not feel like anything at all.
Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective, 2020
We reply to comments by Rodrick Wallace and Nicholas D. Smith on our article, "Collective Belief ... more We reply to comments by Rodrick Wallace and Nicholas D. Smith on our article, "Collective Belief Defended."
We evaluate several significant objections to the possibility of group belief. These incredulity ... more We evaluate several significant objections to the possibility of group belief. These incredulity objections urge that the very concept of group belief is suspect or incoherent. Although many other objections to group belief exist, these incredulity objections can be plausibly resisted. Smith argues that there cannot be group beliefs, and that it is fallacious to maintain that functional equivalence between individual cognitive processes and group processes may establish group cognition. Ludwig's distributive analysis of plural action sentences-as well as Phelan, Arico, and Nichols's experimental studies of lay discursive practices-aim to show that ordinary discursive practices are not committed to group agency and mentality. We argue that Smith's objections against group belief are contestable, that it is not generally fallacious to identify functionally equivalent processes, and that the burden of proof rests with those who would maintain that processes which are functionally equivalent to mental processes are nevertheless not mental. We further argue that Ludwig's analysis and Phelan et al.'s studies are not decisive.
We argue that the pratyabhijñā (recognition) system of Kaśmir Śaivism holds an inconsistent posit... more We argue that the pratyabhijñā (recognition) system of Kaśmir Śaivism holds an inconsistent position. On the one hand, the Pratyabhijñā regards Śiva as an impersonal mechanism and the universe, including persons, as not having agency; call this the Impersonal Component. On the other hand, it considers Śiva himself as a person, and individual persons as having agency sufficient to respond to Śiva; call this the Personal Component. We maintain that the Personal Component should be affirmed and the Impersonal Component rejected. The Impersonal Component’s claim that Śiva is unaware of and unaffected by his manifestation should be rejected, and the doctrine of satkāryavāda should be modified. The universe is Śiva’s manifestation, in the first instance, but it also has a relative autonomy from him. Moreover, humans have agency and freedom. Their actions effect Śiva. He grows and develops in response to his manifestation.
We speculate with Hegel about language, critiquing interpretations of Hegel’s views on language g... more We speculate with Hegel about language, critiquing interpretations of Hegel’s views on language given by Jim Vernon, John McCumber, Stephen Houlgate, and Michael N. Forster, as well as defending Sophisticated Radical Whorfianism from the objections of Maria Francisca Reines and Jesse Prinz. Prior to discussing Forster, we explicate Hegel’s views on mechanical memory. We conclude by discussing why, although thought grows up, it does not move out.
We seek to constitute the extended mind’s fourth wave, socially distributed group cognition, and ... more We seek to constitute the extended mind’s fourth wave, socially distributed group cognition, and we do so by thinking with Hegel. The extended mind theory’s first wave invokes the parity principle, which maintains that processes that occur external to the organism’s skin should be considered mental if they are regarded as mental when they occur inside the organism. The second wave appeals to the complementarity principle, which claims that what is crucial is that these processes together constitute a cognitive system. The first two waves assume that cognitive systems have well-defined territories or boundaries, and that internal and external processes do not switch location. The third wave rejects these assumptions, holding instead that internal processes are not privileged, and internal and external processes can switch, and that processes can be distributed among individuals. The fourth wave would advocate socially distributed group cognition. Groups are deterritorialized collective agents; they are ineliminatively and irreducibly real, they have mental states. Individuals constitute groups, but groups also constitute individuals. What counts as an individual and a group is a function of the level of analysis. And they are conflicted.
This article elucidates monistic Kaśmir Śaivism through comparisons to contemporary science. It ... more This article elucidates monistic Kaśmir Śaivism through comparisons to contemporary science. It shows that Śaivism can be set on a trajectory towards Hegel. While Śaivism reaches Prussia, the resources to articulate Hegel’s Absolute are in Kaśmir.
Joshua Anderson argues that Amartya Sen’s reading of the Bhagavadgītā is not accurate and so it c... more Joshua Anderson argues that Amartya Sen’s reading of the Bhagavadgītā is not accurate and so it cannot serve as an example of Sen’s comprehensive consequentialism. This article presents Sen’s reading of the Bhagavadgītā and Anderson’s criticisms of Sen’s reading. It discusses three types of readers: history readers, activist readers, and interventionist readers. It gives an interventionist reading of the Bhagavadgītā, supplementing Arjuna’s reasons and contesting those of Kṛṣṇa. It shows that Arjuna’s reasons are cogent and it respectfully argues that Kṛṣṇa’s arguments are incomplete and unconvincing. Even if Arjuna’s reasons are not ultimately decisive, they legitimately feature in his deliberations. It responds to Anderson, urging that Sen correctly advocates comprehensive consequentialism and agent-relativity, rather than cumulative outcomes and agent-neutrality, and that Sen correctly sees these contrasts exemplified in the Bhagavadgītā. It concludes with a discussion of the impartial spectator, kin, and self.
In “The Extended Mind Rehabilitates the Metaphysical Hegel,” J. M. Fritzman and Kristin Parvizian... more In “The Extended Mind Rehabilitates the Metaphysical Hegel,” J. M. Fritzman and Kristin Parvizian demonstrate that the thesis of the extended mind provides the resources to articulate and defend the metaphysical reading of Hegel’s philosophy. This chapter substantially extends that argument by showing that the reading of Hegel’s Geist as immodestly metaphysical is philosophically credible.
Regarding each philosophy as a variation of that of Spinoza, this article compares the German Ide... more Regarding each philosophy as a variation of that of Spinoza, this article compares the German Idealism of Schelling and Hegel with the Indian Vedānta of Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja, as well as Abhinavagupta’s Kaśmiri Śaivism. It argues that only Hegel’s philosophy does not fail. For Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja, Abhinavagupta, and Schelling, the experience of ultimate reality—Brahman for Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja, Śiva for Abhinavagupta, the Absolute for Schelling—is self-authenticating and so excludes the possibility of error. However, there is also no possibility of truth as no criterion distinguishes truth from error when individuals make contradictory claims. By contrast, Hegel’s Geist is an extended mind that potentially encompasses the human community. Geist develops historically. Experience is conceptual and concepts must be socially recognized to be legitimate. Experience is fallible, for Hegel, and better accounts are obtained through mutual criticism. Although disagreement represents an impassible impasse for Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja, Abhinavagupta, and Schelling, it is the road forward for Hegel.
The non-metaphysical interpretation of Hegel’s philosophy asserts that the metaphysical reading i... more The non-metaphysical interpretation of Hegel’s philosophy asserts that the metaphysical reading is not credible and so his philosophy must be rationally reconstructed so as to elide its metaphysical aspects. We show that the thesis of the extended mind approaches the metaphysical reading, thereby undermining denials of its credibility, and providing the resources to articulate and defend the metaphysical reading of Hegel’s philosophy. This fully rehabilitates the metaphysical Hegel. We do not argue for the truth of the metaphysical Hegel’s claims. Rather, we defend the correctness of reading his philosophy as metaphysical.
This article presents Schelling’s claim that nature has an evolutionary process and Hegel’s respo... more This article presents Schelling’s claim that nature has an evolutionary process and Hegel’s response that nature is the development of the concept. It then examines whether evolution is progressive. This article argues that, insofar as a notion of progress is conceptually ineliminatable from evolutionary biology or required to articulate the shape of life’s history, progress should be viewed as constitutive.
Using Putnam’s brain-in-a-vat thought experiment, this article argues that interpretations which ... more Using Putnam’s brain-in-a-vat thought experiment, this article argues that interpretations which assert that Hegel’s philosophy, or some portion of it, develops in an entirely a priori manner are incoherent. An alternative reading is then articulated.
Patricia Jagentowicz Mills and Heidi M. Ravven claim that Hegel’s account of Antigone in the Phen... more Patricia Jagentowicz Mills and Heidi M. Ravven claim that Hegel’s account of Antigone in the Phenomenology of Spirit offers a transhistorical account of gender relations. Philip J. Kain and Stuart Swindle argue that “Lordship and Bondage” corresponds to the Antigone account. Each position is one sided. Kain and Swindle are correct that Hegel’s discussions correspond, but their argument is mistaken. Mills and Ravven rightly reject their argument, but wrongly claim that there is no correspondence. Both positions can be sublated by rejecting their shared assumption that the Phenomenology of Spirit advances linearly. Recognizing how Hegel’s text actually proceeds reveals that it does not provide a transhistorical account.
We first present Hegel’s philosophy of history. Next, we discuss objections to it that have been... more We first present Hegel’s philosophy of history. Next, we discuss objections to it that have been made by Ranajit Guha and Vinay Lal. Finally, we refashion Hegel’s philosophy to meet their objections.
There have been several major challenges to Hegel’s criticisms of Spinoza’s philosophy. Thus far... more There have been several major challenges to Hegel’s criticisms of Spinoza’s philosophy. Thus far, no effective response has been made to those challenges. This article defends Hegel’s criticisms of Spinoza’s philosophy, and it argues that the challenges to his criticisms fail.
This article demonstrates that Hegel and Rushdie are contemporaries and that the Phenomenology of... more This article demonstrates that Hegel and Rushdie are contemporaries and that the Phenomenology of Spirit and Midnight’s Children are each others counterpart—philosophical and literary, respectively. It shows that the narrative structures of the Phenomenology of Spirit and Midnight’s Children are identical, and both texts culminate in the remembrance of their narrative journeys. It argues that authenticity is constituted by the inauthentic. Recognizing that both texts remain open to the future, this article concludes by urging that India is now the land of the future and that Midnight’s Children is the continuation of the Phenomenology of Spirit.
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Papers by J. M. Fritzman